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THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE
PROFESSOR RALPH RUEBNER*

In a 1941 radio broadcast, Winston Churchill announced that "we are in
1
The French prosecutor at
the presence of a crime without a name."
so undreamt of in2
monstrous,
so
crime
Nuremberg described it as "'a
to define it."'
coined
be
to
had
'genocide'
term
the
that
history...
Professor Raphael Lemkin, an international law scholar who had escaped
Nazi Europe, was the driving force to make "an old practice in its modem
development ' 3 an international crime. He gave it a name in 1944.4 He
combined the ancient Greek word genos - race or tribe - and the Latin
suffix cide-killing, 5 and thus the term genocide made its appearance as a
legal and political concept. Lemkin asserted that "genocide must be treated
as the most heinous of all crimes. It is the crime of crimes, one that not6only
of mankind.",
shocks our conscience but affects deeply the best interests
At the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the indictments
charged the major German war criminals with "'deliberate and systematic
genocide,"' not as a separate crime, "but only as a distinct manifestation of
7
war crimes and crimes against humanity." The Nuremberg judgment did
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the
valuable assistance of his research assistant Heather Voom, a third year law student at The
John Marshall Law School.
1. WARREN FREEDMAN, GENOCIDE: A PEOPLE'S WILL TO LIVE 11 (1992) (internal
quotations omitted). In his book, Freedman mistakenly claims that Churchill's radio
broadcast occurred in 1940. Id. at 11. See Prime Minister Winston Churchill'sBroadcast
to the World about the Meeting with PresidentRoosevelt (radio broadcast Aug. 24, 1941),
24
available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/4108 a.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2005).
2. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (2000).
3. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944).
4. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
5. LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 79.
6. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 4 UNITED
NATIONS BULLETIN 70 (Jan. 15, 1948).
7. Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 286 & nn.2-3 (1999). The indictment charged the war
criminals with "'deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and
national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied territories in order to
destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups,
particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others."' Id. at 286 n.2. See also Matthew
Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
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not specifically use the term genocide or refer to genocide as a concept,
however, it "dealt at great length... with the substance of the charge of
genocide." 8 One possible explanation for this omission is the observation of
Professor Leo Kuper that "[g]enocide would constitute a crime against
humanity, though it could also take the form of a war crime, there being
much overlapping between the two categories." 9 Genocide was nonetheless
mentioned by the Nuremberg Tribunal at the sentencing stage.' 0 As the
Rwanda Tribunal observed in the Prosecutor v. Kambanda judgment, the
crimes of the Holocaust that were prosecuted at Nuremberg "were very much
constitutive of genocide, but they could not be defined as such because the
crime of genocide was not defined until later.""
When Adolf Eichmann stood trial in Israel in 1961, he was not charged
with genocide because the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, in enacting the Nazi
and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law of 1950, identified the crimes of the
Holocaust as Crimes Against the Jewish People and deferred enacting the
law for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.12
While the judgment of the Supreme Court in Eichmann v. Attorney
General of Israel recognized that the Genocide Convention could not be
applied retroactively,' 3 it nonetheless determined that the Convention's
definition of genocide corresponded to the Crimes Against the Jewish
People.' 4 Of greater importance is the finding by the Supreme Court that the
principles of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, in contrast to
the obligation of nations to prevent genocide, "were already part of
customary international law when the dreadful crimes [of the Holocaust]
were perpetrated."' 5 The court concluded that the acts of genocide were
included under "crimes against humanity" that "have always been forbidden
16
by customary international law.,
For Lemkin, genocide was:
a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 426 (1998).
8. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 22

(1981).
9. Id.at 21-22. See also LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION 24 (1991) (discussing that the Nuremberg Tribunal was
authorized to try Nazi war criminals for crimes against humanity, which are included in
genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention).
10. KUPER, supra note 8, at 25.
11. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement,
14 (Sept. 4,
1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Kambanda/judgement/kambanda.
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
12.

HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF

EVIL 269 (1963). See also GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 299-300 (4th ed.,
Schocken Books, Inc. 1977) (1966).
13. CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. Att'y Gen. of Isr. [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 2033, reprinted
in 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968).
14. Id. at 287.
15. Id. at 297 (internal quotations omitted).
16. Id.
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groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of
the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings,
religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of
the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the
individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals,
group. 17
not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national

His definition was both broad and narrow: broad because he did not
limit the effect of genocide to biological extinction of a national group. For
Lemkin, genocide not only extinguishes the existence of a national group;
ultimately it destroys the cultural contributions of that group. Consequently,
"[w]orld culture is impoverished. 1 8 On the other hand, it was narrow
because he limited genocide to national, religious, or racial groups, thereby
excluding other groups.
A 1946 United Nations General Assembly Resolution affirmed "the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
' 9
The definition of genocide in
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."
another Resolution, passed on the same day, surpassed Lernkin's conception
of the crime to include as targets of genocide "racial, religious, political and
other groups." 20 That formulation was narrowed, however, two years later,
in 1948, when the United Nations adopted unanimously the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. As a political statement, driven
21
by intense negotiations and compromises, the Convention defines genocide
as follows:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting. on the oup conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in wFlole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
group.22
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another

17. LEMK1N, supra note 3, at 79.
18. LEMKIN, supra note 6, at 70.
19. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th plen. mtg. at 188, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
20. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th plen. mtg. at 189, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
21. KUPER, supra note 8, at 32. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union
opposed certain provisions for fear that they would be used against their countries' own
conduct. Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great InternationalInstitution of the
Twentieth Century: The InternationalCriminalCourt's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY

INT'L L. REV. 351, 356 (2002). Also, during the drafting period, Stalin had already begun
targeting social and political groups. Id. Thus, a "conservative definition of genocide"
was created to deal with such political influences. Id. at 355.
22. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
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Critics of the definition of genocide have argued that it is overinclusive because it goes beyond biological destruction of a cognizable group
to include cultural genocide.23 Others counter that "the essence of genocide
is the cultural disappearance of a group. 24 There are those who argue that
the current definition of genocide in the Convention is under-inclusive,
pointing to the exclusion of political, social and economic groups. 25
The harshest criticism is directed at the ambiguities of certain terms in
the Convention. Critics argue, for example, that the mens rea of the crime of
genocide, namely the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part,, 26 and the actus
reus of "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,"
are unacceptably vague.27 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has argued that the
specific intent element of the crime may be too difficult to prove against a
person who merely carries out or executes a genocidal plan.28 Others reply
that "[t]he concept of genocide ...[is] one of the best defined" but least
adhered to "in the lexicon of modem times. 29
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The crime of
genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention was included in the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. 30 A year later, in 1994, the Security Council
established a similar tribunal for Rwanda using once again the Genocide
Convention's definition of the crime. 31 The 1998 Rome Statute of the
23. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The International Criminal Court: Contemporary
Perspectives and Prospectsfor Ratification, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 505, 525-26
(2000) (comments of Professor George Fletcher).
24. Letter from Matthew Lippman, Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago, to
Ralph Ruebner, Professor, The John Marshall Law School (May 5, 2005) (on file with
author). See Hurst Hannum, InternationalLaw and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of
Silence, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 82, 106 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he concept of cultural genocide
was ultimately excluded from the Convention"); KUPER, supra note 8, at 31 (noting that
cultural genocide was not included in the Convention). See also, JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 917 n.2 (2d ed. 2000) ("Cultural
groups are not directly included within the customary definition of genocide, but cultural
characteristics might similarly relate to conclusions about other groupings.").
25. Kurt Jonassohn, What is Genocide?, in GENOCIDE WATCH 17, 18 (Helen Fein ed.
1992); KUPER, supra note 8, at 32.
26. See, e.g., LEBLANC, supra note 9, at 34-36; RICHARD ARENS, GENOCIDE IN
PARAGUAY 8-16, 141 (1976).
27. BARBARA HARFF, GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ISSUES 11-12 (Karen A. Feste ed., 1984).
28. PAUST, supra note 24, at 918.
29. IRVING HOROWITZ, TAKING LIVES: GENOCIDE AND STATE POWER 15 (5th ed.,
rev. 1982).
30. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 808, art. 4(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/25704 (May 25,
1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 166 (1998).
3 1. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, S.C. Res. 955, art. 2(2), U.N. Doc.
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International Criminal Court identified genocide as the first crime in the
court's jurisdiction and incorporated the Genocide Convention's definition of
the crime.32
To assist the International Criminal Court in the interpretation of the
crime of genocide, the 2000 text of the Preparatory Commission for the
Court33 clarified some, but not all, of the terms that had been challenged
previously for being vague. For example, the elements of genocide by
killing are identified in part as follows: "[t]he perpetrator killed one or more
persons... [who] belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group" with the intent "to destroy, in whole or in part" that group,
and that this "conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed3' 4against that group or was conduct that could itself
effect such destruction.
Vagueness in the Genocide Convention can be easily attributed to the
fact that the definition of genocide is political in nature. As such, it is
intentionally imprecise in order to accommodate one distinct aim of the
Convention, the prevention of genocide, which must be separated from the
other purpose of the convention, namely the punishment of genocidal acts.
Conceptually, flexibility in language helps a political decision to intervene in
the early stages of genocide through diplomacy, humanitarian aid and, if
necessary, military use, as a preventive measure. Thus, in instances where
the evidence of genocide is not clear cut, vagueness in the Convention's
terms allows nations to err in favor of prevention through intervention.
But what has happened in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur,
and other places around the globe since World War II, illustrates that the
vague contours of the term "genocide" have served an unintended
consequence, one of doing nothing, or little, to prevent genocide. There are
many reasons: realpolitik, geo-political and economic interests, domestic
35
To avoid their collective and
politics, and just plain indifference.

S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998).
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5-6,

U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [as corrected by the process-verbaux of November 10, 1998 and
July 12, 1999], reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), amended text available at
www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99 corr/corr.html (last visited on Oct. 16, 2005).
33. Preparatory Commission on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,

Report of the PreparatoryCommission on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal

Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (2000).
34. Id. at art. 6(a) (footnote omitted).
35. Bill Clinton explained why he did not intervene in Rwanda this way:
A plane crash killing the Rwandan president and the president of Burundi sparked
the beginning of a horrendous slaughter inflicted by leaders of the majority Hutu on
the Tutsis and their Hutu sympathizers. The Tutsis constituted only 15 percent of
the population but were thought to have disproportionate economic and political
power. I ordered the evacuation of all Americans and sent troops to guarantee their
safety. Within one hundred days, more than 800,000 people in a country of only 8
million would be murdered, most of them with machetes. We were so preoccupied
with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six months old, and with opposition
in Congress to military deployments in faraway places not vital to our national
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individual responsibilities to prevent genocide, nations have avoided the "g"
word, choosing instead to describe genocidal acts as "mass violence,"
"horrendous slaughter" or "ethnic cleansing."
While vagueness in terms may serve political ends, an imprecise
definition of genocide as a legal description of a crime is unacceptable as a
basis for prosecuting and punishing offenders. Such vagueness runs counter
to the universally recognized norms of legality and due process. Can we
cure this problem? One possible solution is for the United Nations to revisit
the Genocide Convention and make its terms more precise. Other options
include further clarifications of the Genocide Convention by the Preparatory
Commission and judicial construction of the Convention's terms by
international tribunals. Given the long and difficult road to ratification of the
Genocide Convention and the uncertainties that may arise out of future
political debates and new compromises, the latter approaches seem more
promising.
The first international court to ever convict an individual of genocide,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for example, has
demonstrated a willingness to shore up the ambiguities of certain terms
through liberal judicial construction in order to facilitate future prosecutions
of genocide. As an example, that court cleared up the vagueness problem
that is associated with the element of intent. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu
judgment explained that the Genocide Convention's term "intent" is a
"special intent" or "dolus specialis.'36 It held that:
Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive
element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to
produce the act charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies
in 'the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such'. Thus, for a crime of genocide to have been
committed, it is necessary that one of the acts listed under [Article II of the
Convention] be committed, that the particular act be committed against a
specifically
37 targeted group, it being a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group.
Another example of judicial construction is the Rwanda Tribunal's
interpretation of the term imposing "measures intended to prevent births
within the group" to include "sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization,
forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. 38

interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy team adequately focused on
sending troops to stop the slaughter. With a few thousand troops and help from our
allies, even making allowances for the time it would have taken to deploy them, we
could have saved lives. The failure to try to stop Rwanda's tragedies became one
of the greatest regrets ofmy presidency.
BILL CLINTON, My LIFE 592-93 (2004).

36. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement,
498-499 (Sept. 2,
1998) available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/Akayesu/judgement/akay01l.htm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
37. Id.
38. Id. 507.
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The ultimate use of judicial construction is the Rwanda Tribunal's
attempt to clarify the term "ethnic group." Recognizing that "[t]he term
ethnic group is, in general, used to refer to a group whose members speak the
39
nonetheless, the Tribunal
same language and/or have the same culture,
determined that the Hum and the Tutsi, who share the same language and
culture, are distinct ethnic groups as a consequence of their separate
treatment by their Belgian colonizers and their self identification as separate
groups. These two groups were part of a single ethnic group that was
fractured socially, economically and politically, and therefore objectively
4°
Yet the
they are not separate cognizable groups under the Convention.
is,
a
group
Prosecutor v. Rutagandajudgment declared that "membership of
is
victim
The
in essence, a subjective rather than an objective concept.
for
slated
group
a
perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as belonging to
destruction. In some instances, the victim may perceive himself/herself as
41
This new definition of what constitutes a
belonging to the said group.,
group requires a tribunal to engage in "a case-by-case" analysis which
"tak[es] into account both the relevant evidence proffered and the [social,]
political and cultural context.2
Professor George Fletcher argues that genocide is a collective crime
and criticizes the focus of international criminal law "that has prevailed since
Nuremberg, ' 43 which he says, "emphasized the responsibility of
individuals"' 44 for the crime of genocide. He claims that "[t]he faqade of
individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths" about the crime of
genocide, which he concludes, are "collective crimes" involving "deeds that
by their very nature are committed by groups and typically against
''45
Professor Fletcher
individuals [who are] members of [other] groups.
"ambition [of
collective
the
is
argues that central to the crime of genocide
46
group.",
[other]
hated
the
eliminate
one group] to

39. Id.

122 n.56.

40. Id. 11 122 n.56, 702 (acknowledging that generally since the Hutus and Tutsis
spoke the same language and had the same culture, they would therefore constitute a single
ethnic group; however, due to societal treatment, the tribunal concluded they were, in fact,
treated as separate groups). See also Shah, supra note 21, at 369-70 (stating that the
Rwandan Tribunal contradicted itself by finding that Hutus and Tutsis constituted separate
ethnic groups); van der Vyver, supra note 7, at 303-04 (noting that the two Rwandan
groups shared the same nationality, race and similar religion and, therefore, under the
Genocide Convention, should not be deemed to compose a single ethnic group). The
difference between the Hutus and the Tutsis was largely based on "material means" such
as the ownership of cattle and societal status. Id. at 304.
41. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement, 56 (Dec. 6, 1999)
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm (last
visited Aug. 24, 2005).
42. Id. 158.
43. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM

45 (2002).

44. Id. at 44.
45. Id. at 45.

46. Id. at 68.
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When it comes to genocide, he claims, "there are in fact two
perpetrators - the individual [leader] and the nation. '' 4 7 He maintains that a
nation shoulders guilt for the genocidal policies of its leader when it fails to
protest the ways of the leader.48 He concludes that a dictator like Milosevic
did not carry out ethnic cleansing in a vacuum. "To muster power [a
dictator] must enjoy the support of the military, the implicit emotional
consent of business leaders and professionals, and the tolerance of the public
as a whole. ' 49
Professor Fletcher is quite correct when he says that the
implementation of a genocidal plan would not be possible without the active
support, or at a minimum, the acquiescence of the collective nation. Daniel
Goldhagen made the same charge that it was ordinary Germans, 50 men and
women, 51 who wholeheartedly embraced Hitler's genocidal plan 52 and who
became the "assenting mass executioners. 53 Collectively, leader and nation
capitalized on historically rooted "virulent racial, 54 and "demonological antisemitism ' 55 to view Jews as the eternal enemies, whose annihilation was
"just and necessary. ' 56 Complicity by silence and the failure of individuals
to oppose a leader's genocidal plan is equally reprehensible, a phenomenon
which Hannah Arendt described as the "banality of evil." 57
Finding that a leader cannot be guilty of genocide alone, Professor
Fletcher opines that the nation's complicity should mitigate "the penalties of
those who commit horrendous crimes. 58 According to Fletcher, criminal
liability and punishment should be assessed "according to relative fault." 59
He justifies this on a principle that "distribut[es] responsibility and guilt
among all parties - and only those parties - that actively participate in the
occurrence of evil." 6°
His views should be rejected. I am concerned that the refocusing of
genocide as a collective crime may, in the long run, water down the criminal
liability and punishment of the most culpable individuals, namely the
architects of genocide. As the Nuremberg Tribunal noted: "Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by

47. Id. at 163.
48. Id. at 159.

49. Id.
50. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 393 (1996).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at416.

Id.
at 418-19.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 394.
See generally

ARENDT,

supra note 12 (reporting the atrocities of genocide

committed by the Nazi regime as "the banality of evil").
58. FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 176.

59. Id. at 158.
60. Id.
at 157-58.
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punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced.'
To label genocide as a collective crime, I fear, will not, as Professor
62
Fletcher asserts, "enhance[] the principle of individual responsibility."
Instead, it may make it easier for a political leader, like a Milosevic, who
conceives the idea and then devises a plan for genocide as a policy for his
nation, to avoid maximal responsibility, escape the harshest possible
punishment and shift liability onto those individuals down the hierarchy who
execute his genocidal plan. They will shoulder most, if not all, of the blame.
Assessing liability and punishment "according to relative fault" presupposes
that a tribunal, be it a permanent or an ad hoc court, can make this
determination objectively. But what criteria shall it apply? Is the one who
conceives the idea and designs a genocidal plan more reprehensible and
culpable, or less, than the commander who orders the execution of the plan
or the individual who finally commits the genocidal act, or perhaps, are they
equally culpable?
Isn't "relative fault" after all a subjective standard? And if it is, how
can it serve the interests of justice? Fletcher eventually concedes that "these
the inquiry
questions elude objective determination; the court conducting
63
could well be influenced by its own political agenda.,
Professor Fletcher's analogy to an automobile collision involving two
64
drivers who "cause damage to each other and their respective passengers,
and therefore, should be liable and "pay for the damage in proportion to the
negligence of each,, 65 does not hold up in this context. The two drivers in
his example are completely independent actors whose separate negligent
conduct accounts for the collective damage. In contrast, the dictator wields
absolute power over the nation and controls and directs each and every
individual who carries out his genocidal plan. The executioner is but a mere
extension of the leader.
The recent United Nations Darfur Commission Investigation Report
illustrates the problem of identifying genocide as a collective crime. Chaired
by Professor Antonio Cassese, who previously served as the first president of
the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the report was released
earlier this year, one day after a special session of the U.N. General
66
Assembly to observe the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.
The Commission, using a very low threshold for proof, one of
reasonable suspicion, 67 and not probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, absolved the Government of the Sudan of pursuing or implementing a
61. 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIALS OF THE MAJOR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).
62. FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 157.

WAR

63. Id.at 163.
64. Id. at 158.
65. Id.
66. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 1, delivered to the United Nations Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005).

67. Id. 15.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:1227

policy of genocide, directly by its military or through the Janjaweed militias
under its control.68 It recommended instead that the Security Council refer
the circumstances of Darfur to the International Criminal Court for further
investigation.69 On March 31, 2005, the Security Council did make that
referral to the court without any further elaboration. 70 Implicit in this
recommendation is that the names of the leaders who conceived, organized
and directed the Darfur genocide were not included in the sealed envelope.
In conclusion, the road from Nuremberg to Jerusalem, Rome, and
finally The Hague has been slow, circuitous, and bumpy. Vagueness and
ambiguity of terms can be fixed judicially. The dual purposes of the
Convention - the prevention of genocide and the punishment for genocidal
acts - must be respected and fully enforced. If there is a will, there is a
way.

68. Id. 518-522, 640-642. The report stated that arguably the elements of genocide,
the actus reus and a protected group, could be shown from the human rights violations
perpetrated directly and indirectly by the Sudan Government. Id. TT 518, 640. Notably
lacking, the commission observed, was the element of genocidal intent. Id. According to
the commission:
Generally... the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of
some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a
group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather .... the
intent [seems to be] to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of
counter-insurgency warfare.
Id. The report further states that certain individuals, including Sudan officials, may have
acted with genocidal intent, but it is for "a competent court to make such a determination
on a case by case basis." Id. 520. See also id. 641 (reiterating the above stated
proposition).
69. See id.
647 (stating that pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, the situation in Darfur should be referred to the court by the
Security Council). Implicit in this referral is that the court can look at specific cases to
determine if individuals may have committed acts with genocidal intent and therefore the
court could prosecute accordingly. See id. 44 520, 641 (stating that whether specific
individuals acted with genocidal intent is a decision to be made by a capable court).
70. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).

